{"id":725519,"date":"2026-05-04T19:41:03","date_gmt":"2026-05-04T16:41:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/"},"modified":"2026-05-04T19:41:03","modified_gmt":"2026-05-04T16:41:03","slug":"brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/","title":{"rendered":"Brussels reissues its Huawei warning, and prepares to make it stick"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_84 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-custom ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\" style=\"cursor:inherit\">Table of Contents<\/p>\n<label for=\"ez-toc-cssicon-toggle-item-6a22c520b7edd\" class=\"ez-toc-cssicon-toggle-label\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #dd3333;color:#dd3333\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #dd3333;color:#dd3333\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/label><input type=\"checkbox\"  id=\"ez-toc-cssicon-toggle-item-6a22c520b7edd\" checked aria-label=\"Toggle\" \/><nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/#What_the_recommendation_actually_says_and_what_it_does_not\" >What the recommendation actually says, and what it does not<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/#Why_the_voluntary_phase_did_not_work\" >Why the voluntary phase did not work<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/#What_the_connectivity-infrastructure_framing_adds\" >What the connectivity-infrastructure framing adds<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/#The_wider_tech-sovereignty_arc\" >The wider tech-sovereignty arc<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/brussels-reissues-its-huawei-warning-and-prepares-to-make-it-stick\/#What_happens_next\" >What happens next?<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.thenextweb.com\/2026\/05\/European-Commision.avif\" \/><\/p>\n<div id=\"article-main-content\">\n<p><em>The European Commission has formally recommended that member states keep Huawei and ZTE out of their connectivity infrastructure. The same restrictions are now moving toward becoming legally binding. China has already threatened to retaliate.<\/em><\/p>\n<hr\/>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">When the European Commission first asked its member states to keep Huawei and ZTE out of their 5G networks, <\/span><a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en\/library\/communication-commission-implementation-5g-cybersecurity-toolbox\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">in the 2020 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, it did so as a recommendation. Six years later, on 4 May 2026, the Commission did roughly the same thing again. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/sustainability\/boards-policy-regulation\/eu-recommends-member-states-not-use-huwaei-zte-connectivity-infrastructure-2026-05-04\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Reuters reported<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that Brussels has formally recommended its 27 member states not use the two Chinese vendors\u2019 equipment in their connectivity infrastructure, broadening the original ask beyond mobile networks to the wider stack of telecoms and digital plumbing on which the Union depends.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If that sounds like the Commission is repeating itself, it is, but with a deliberate purpose. Monday\u2019s recommendation is the public-facing companion to a much harder structural shift. <\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"inarticle-wrapper channel-cta\">\n<div class=\"ica-text\">\n<p class=\"ica-text__title\">TNW City Coworking space &#8211; Where your best work h<a href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/category\/download-scripts-themes-apps\/\" data-internallinksmanager029f6b8e52c=\"9\" title=\"Download Scripts &amp; Themes &amp; Apps\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">app<\/a>ens<\/p>\n<p>A workspace designed for growth, collaboration, and endless networking opportunities in the heart of tech.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The same restrictions are now moving, through a draft cybersecurity law presented in January, toward becoming legally binding obligations on member states with infringement procedures attached. The voluntary phase, by Brussels\u2019s own admission, did not work.<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_the_recommendation_actually_says_and_what_it_does_not\"><\/span>What the recommendation actually says, and what it does not<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Commission\u2019s 4 May text reaffirms its longstanding position that Huawei and ZTE pose risks materially higher than other suppliers in the EU\u2019s connectivity layer, and instructs member-state governments and telecoms operators not to use their equipment in critical network infrastructure. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The recommendation, as published, is non-binding. National regulators retain formal authority over their own procurement decisions. Member states that wish to continue using the two vendors are not, in narrow legal terms, prevented from doing so.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">What has changed is that the recommendation is no longer the Commission\u2019s main lever. <\/span><a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.eunews.it\/en\/2026\/01\/20\/critical-infrastructure-commission-aims-to-ban-member-states-from-selecting-suppliers-they-will-be-appointed-in-brussels\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On 20 January 2026<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, Henna Virkkunen, the EU\u2019s Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, presented a cybersecurity package designed precisely to convert the soft instrument into a hard one. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Under the proposed law, components from designated high-risk suppliers would have to be removed from key network infrastructure within 36 months of the rules taking effect; member states ignoring the obligation would face infringement procedures and possible financial penalties. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><em>\u201cIt didn\u2019t work on a voluntary basis,\u201d<\/em> Virkkunen said at the time, in a remark widely reproduced by <\/span><a rel=\"nofollow\" target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/next\/2026\/01\/20\/brussels-pushes-for-stronger-cybersecurity-oversight-of-high-risk-technology-suppliers\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Euronews and CNBC<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Monday\u2019s recommendation, in that context, is best read as a holding pattern: a reaffirmation of the underlying policy direction while the legislative apparatus that will actually impose it works through co-decision.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Why_the_voluntary_phase_did_not_work\"><\/span>Why the voluntary phase did not work<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>Numbers help. By Euro<a href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/category\/news\/\" data-internallinksmanager029f6b8e52c=\"2\" title=\"News\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">news<\/a>\u2019s count, as of February 2024, only 11 of the EU\u2019s then-27 member states had taken concrete 5G security measures targeting Huawei and ZTE. By the time the Commission\u2019s January 2026 package was unveiled, that figure had moved to 13.<\/p>\n<p>In other words, after six years of steady regulatory pressure, slightly fewer than half of the member states had acted on the recommendation that has now been re-recommended.<\/p>\n<p>The reasons are partly economic and partly political. Germany, the EU\u2019s largest market, was the most visible holdout: Huawei equipment was estimated to be in approximately 60 per cent of German 5G sites as recently as late 2024, and the cost and complexity of replacing it has, until now, been treated by Berlin as a slower, locally driven process. Several Eastern European member states have been similarly reluctant.<\/p>\n<p>The Commission\u2019s frustration with that pattern is, by all accounts, the proximate political cause of the legislative push.<\/p>\n<p>Member states with strong domestic vendors, France with Nokia\u2019s Alcatel-Lucent, and Sweden with Ericsson, have been more aligned with Brussels\u2019s position from the start. Sweden, in particular, banned Huawei and ZTE from its 5G network back in October 2020.<\/p>\n<p>The downstream consequence was instructive: Ericsson\u2019s China revenue fell 46 per cent the year after the Swedish ban, and the company has not since recovered that business. Capitals reading the Commission\u2019s draft law are aware of that history.<\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_the_connectivity-infrastructure_framing_adds\"><\/span>What the connectivity-infrastructure framing adds<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Until now, the Commission\u2019s primary focus has been mobile networks: 5G core, radio access, the equipment that determines how citizens connect. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Monday\u2019s recommendation broadens the language to \u201cconnectivity infrastructure\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/category\/general\/\" data-internallinksmanager029f6b8e52c=\"3\" title=\"General\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">general<\/a>ly, and the Commission has signalled that the eventual binding regime will extend to fixed networks, fibre-optic and submarine cables, and satellite networks. Phase-out periods for those categories will be announced later.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The submarine-cable extension is, in some ways, the most strategically consequential. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We wrote on the geopolitical tension building around undersea cable infrastructure<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, which carries the bulk of the EU\u2019s intercontinental internet traffic and has, in recent years, become a focus of suspected sabotage incidents in the Baltic and the Red Sea. Excluding high-risk suppliers from that layer of the stack is a different kind of project from excluding them from a base station. It is also, by most expert accounts, more urgent.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">China\u2019s reaction was characteristically firm. Beijing has called the cybersecurity package \u201cdiscriminatory\u201d and threatened to retaliate against European companies operating in the Chinese market. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We wrote earlier this year on China\u2019s broader pattern of retaliatory threats against the EU<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, and the May 4 statement from Beijing repeats the same playbook. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The threat carries weight because the EU\u2019s exposure to Chinese countermeasures is asymmetric. Major European industrial groups, particularly in autos, luxury goods, and machinery, depend on the Chinese market in ways that small Chinese exposure to the EU does not match. Brussels knows this. So does Beijing.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Whether the threat actually changes the legislative trajectory is another matter. The Commission\u2019s January package is now in the hands of the European Parliament and the Council. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Member states with the most to lose from Chinese retaliation, Germany above all, have leverage in those negotiations. But the political cost of rolling back the cybersecurity push, after six years of public commitment to it, would be unusually high.<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_wider_tech-sovereignty_arc\"><\/span>The wider tech-sovereignty arc<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Monday\u2019s recommendation also fits a broader European pattern that has been visible across the past 12 months. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">TNW has covered the EU\u2019s \u20ac180m sovereign cloud awards<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, France\u2019s directive that government ministries migrate from Windows to Linux, and the EU\u2019s renewed focus on digital sovereignty under both the Cybersecurity Act and the AI Act. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Huawei\/ZTE recommendation is one of the most concrete and enforceable elements of that arc, in the sense that telecoms equipment is a relatively well-defined category and its exclusion can be measured.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It also sits inside a larger strategic question Brussels has been forced to confront more openly in 2026 than ever before. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">China\u2019s Digital Silk Road<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, which has built telecommunications, data-centre, and submarine-cable infrastructure across more than a dozen Belt-and-Road countries with terms favourable to Beijing\u2019s data-sovereignty interests, is a direct counterpart to the EU\u2019s effort to disentangle its own infrastructure from Chinese vendors. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The two arcs, sovereignty in Brussels and sovereignty in Beijing, are now visibly working against each other.<\/span><\/p>\n<h3><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_happens_next\"><\/span>What happens next?<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Three things will indicate whether Monday\u2019s recommendation is more than rhetorical. The first is the legislative timeline: how quickly the European Parliament and Council move the January 2026 cybersecurity package toward a vote, and whether the 36-month phase-out period survives that process intact. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The second is German political will: Berlin\u2019s revised position, in particular on the percentage of its 5G estate currently supplied by Huawei, will be the single most visible test of whether the binding regime can actually be implemented at scale. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The third is the response from operators that have, until now, been quiet, particularly in Italy and Spain, where Huawei\u2019s market share has been substantial and the political costs of public re-procurement have been politically inconvenient.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Commission has, on Monday, repeated itself deliberately. The recommendation is not new. Its legal force is not new. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The policy backdrop, however, has shifted: a mandatory regime is now drafted, China has been explicit about countermeasures, and the EU\u2019s wider tech-sovereignty push has lent the question additional political weight. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">None of which solves the underlying problem of how to remove tens of billions of euros\u2019 worth of installed equipment from networks that European citizens use every day. It does, however, make clear that the question is no longer whether to do so, but how, and on what timetable.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<blockquote><p><strong><span style=\"color: #ff6600;\">If you liked the article, do not forget to share it with your friends. Follow us on\u00a0<span style=\"color: #ff0000;\"><a style=\"color: #ff0000;\" href=\"https:\/\/news.google.com\/publications\/CAAqBwgKMN63nwsw68G3Aw\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\">Google News<\/a><\/span>\u00a0too, click on the star and choose us from your favorites.<\/span><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>If you want to read more like this article, you can visit our <span style=\"color: #ff9900;\"><a style=\"color: #ff9900;\" href=\"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/category\/technology\/\" target=\"_blank\" >Technology category.<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color: black;\"><a style=\"color: #ff9900;\" href=\"https:\/\/thenextweb.com\/news\/eu-huawei-zte-connectivity-infrastructure-recommendation\" target=\"_blank\" >Source<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The European Commission has formally recommended that member states keep Huawei and ZTE out of their connectivity infrastructure. The same restrictions are now moving toward becoming legally binding. China has already threatened to retaliate. When the European Commission first asked its member states to keep Huawei and ZTE out of their 5G networks, in the&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"fifu_image_url":"","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-725519","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-technology"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/725519","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=725519"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/725519\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=725519"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=725519"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/buradabiliyorum.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=725519"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}